

Studies in Public Policy Number 356

WHAT DOES SOCIAL CAPITAL ADD TO
DEMOCRATIC VALUES?

Professor Richard Rose & Craig Weller

Centre for the Study of Public Policy

University of Strathclyde

Glasgow G1 1XH Scotland

2001

SPP 356

WHAT DOES SOCIAL CAPITAL ADD TO DEMOCRATIC VALUES?

© 2001 Richard Rose

ISSN 0140-8240

Abstract

To what extent, if any, does social capital increase support for democratic values of citizens? Is it the primary influence, one among several major influences, or of only minor importance in forming political attitudes. This paper provides an empirical answer to this question, drawing on a specially designed social capital questionnaire field as the 1998 New Russia Barometer. The questionnaire collected multiple measures of involvement in social capital networks in different situations, and included "anti-modern" as well as market and informal strategies for using social capital to get things done. The dependent variables are support for democracy as an ideal and its complement, rejection of undemocratic alternatives. Multiple regression analysis shows that civic attitudes independent of social capital are of most important, and economic influences and human capital are also important. Social capital has very little influence on support for democracy as an ideal, and is of only secondary importance as an influence on rejecting undemocratic alternative. The conclusion argues that the Russian research design is generalizable across the developing world, and generalizable across OECD countries too, because it measures social capital instrumentally.

This paper has been written as part of a project financed by the Leverhulme Trust, London, on "Coping with Organizations: Networks of Social Capital". The survey data was collected with help from a grant to the World Bank Social Capital Initiative by the Development Fund of the Danish government. It will appear in edited form in G. Badescu and Eric Uslaner, eds., Social Capital and Democratic Transition. London and New York: Routledge. The authors are solely responsible for the interpretation presented here.

To what extent, if any, does social capital increase support for democratic values of citizens? Before the recent explosion of interest in social capital, it was usual to explain support for democratic values as a consequence of individual attributes such as education; individual economic circumstances or a country's economic development; and characteristics of political institutions and performance. Because social capital is only one element of the political system, its influence is likely to be limited rather than the primary or exclusive cause of democratic values (cf. Boix and Posner, 1998). The question invites empirical examination of the extent to which social capital, however measured, is the primary influence, one among several major influences, or of only minor importance in forming political attitudes.

In answering this question, we have the advantage of using a questionnaire specially designed to measure social capital in a multiplicity of forms, generic and specific to politics. The 1998 New Russia Barometer (NRB) survey was developed by the first-named author as part of an interdisciplinary World Bank programme designed to determine the importance of social capital in many settings around the world.¹ The concept of social capital fits well in Russia, inasmuch as in Soviet times people developed a wide variety of informal networks to compensate for, or even subvert, the formal commands of a repressive society, and many networks have remained in use following the collapse of Communism (cf. Shlapentokh, 1989; Rose, 2000). Moreover, examining the impact of social capital on democratic values in a regime variously described as an "incomplete democracy" or "partly free" (cf. Rose and Shin, 2001; Freedom House, 2001) provides a robust test of the importance of national context on individual commitment to democratic values.

¹. In the Barometer survey VTsIOM, Russia's oldest not-for-profit survey organization, interviewed 1,908 Russian adults in 191 different primary sampling units representative of the population of the Russian Federation nationwide. Fieldwork took place between 6 March and 13 April 1998. For full details of questions and answers, including a report of the sample, see Rose (1998).

I MULTIPLE FORMS OF CAPITAL REQUIRE A MULTI-CAUSAL MODEL

In economic analysis, capital is the stock of resources used to satisfy wants by contributing to the production of goods and services (Black, 1997: 47). It is consistent with this usage to define social capital instrumentally as producing democracy, jobs or bread (cf. Coleman, 1990). But the influence of social capital is additional to three conventional measures of capital--money, land and labour (Serageldin and Steer, 1994).

◆Material capital. The stock of capital goods used to produce cars, computers, candy bars and other tangible outputs measured in money terms. The annual output from this stock of capital is represented by a country's Gross Domestic Product.

◆Natural capital. Resources in the earth and atmosphere--oil, water, air, arable soil--tend to be given but their cash value requires material capital, for example, oil wells and refineries. The stock of natural capital can be reduced by consumption of non-renewable natural resources or pollution from manufacturing.

◆Human capital. Capital can inhere in individuals as well as in nature and manufactured goods. Educated, skilled and healthy labour has a greater capacity to contribute to the production of material wealth and the satisfaction of human wants generally.

◆Social capital. Formal and informal networks of individuals and organizations that can produce monetized or non-monetized goods and services satisfying wants.

It is misleading to reduce the multi-dimensional character of capital to the single material measure of Gross Domestic Product. Economists are developing techniques to include natural resources and human capital in "balance sheet" profiles of society and sociologists have identified the potential of social capital networks to produce desirable goods such as employment as well as negative outputs, such as terrorist networks.

The foregoing definition of social capital avoids the mistake of Robert Putnam's (1997: 31) widely invoked definition of social capital as 'features of social life--networks, norms and trust--that facilitate cooperation and coordination for mutual benefit'. That definition conflates individual attitudes and behavioural networks, making it impossible to separate the

influence of one on the other. Inglehart (1997: 188) avoids this confusion by adopting a strictly social psychological definition of social capital--'a culture of trust and tolerance' in which 'extensive networks of voluntary associations emerge'--but it begs the question: What creates cultural attitudes? Insofar as attitudes are derived from experience, then social capital networks are the cause rather than the consequence of trust (Dasgupta, 1988).

Social capital networks can be informal or formal. Informal associations are face-to-face networks, and this is true of those with a modicum of formal organization, such as a bowling league or a choir, as well as of groups that meet informally in a pub or picnic in a park. A modern society is defined by having many impersonal formal organizations too--joint stock companies, central banks, social welfare ministries and political parties. Informal networks support or supplement the activities of formal organizations (cf. Weber, 1947; North, 1990).

Informal networks are the building blocks of Putnam's theory of Making Democracy Work (1993). He postulates that the norms and practice of cooperation in face-to-face networks "spills up" into the formation of formal organizations such as political parties that aggregate the preferences of individuals. The paradigm example of spilling up is the preamble to the American Constitution, in which 'we the people of the United States' pledge cooperation to satisfy their collective wants. In Tocqueville's time, more than 90 percent of Americans could only engage in face-to-face voluntaristic networks, for in the 1830s census figures record few communities with more than 2500 people. However, the government of a country of 150 or 250 million people necessarily requires formal organizations. The principle concern of Putnam (2000) is whether involvement in informal and formal networks is increasing or decreasing in the United States today. Putnam (2000) takes it as axiomatic that any change in social capital networks will influence democracy in America.

The existence of multiple resources requires a multi-causal model to test to what extent different forms of capital influence democratic values. For example, educated persons are expected to be more committed to democracy but those with post-modern values may be more dissatisfied if there is coincidentally a deterioration in the natural environment.

Economic approaches assume that people with a higher standard of living will be more committed to a democratic regime. These influences are expected to operate net of any impact of social capital. It is possible for support for democratic values to be high or rising if the influence of a decline in social capital is offset by the positive influence on democratic values of other forms of capital in society.

II MEASURING DEMOCRATIC VALUES


While social capital is about networks, democratic values are attitudes of individuals. One approach to surveying values is to ask individuals the extent to which they regard democracy as the ideal way to govern a country; the concrete meaning of the symbol is left open to each individual respondent. More detailed survey questions show a convergence in meanings attributed to democracy--individual liberty; the right to hold government accountable through elections; and, outside the United States, welfare state values--and Russians too associate these three sets of attributes with the idea of democracy (cf. Simon, 1998; Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Rose, 2001: 22f).

An alternative approach is to ask individuals how satisfied they are with the way democracy works in their country today. However, this approach ignores Robert Dahl's central argument (1971) about the gap between democracy as an unattainable ideal and the "second best" alternative of polyarchy. Given this gap, idealistic democrats dissatisfied with the way their polyarchy is working ought to register dissatisfaction. The question also ignores the distrust of democratically elected governors shown by James Madison and his co-authors in the construction of the American constitution, and by Winston Churchill in his argument for democracy as the lesser evil compared to every other form of government (cf. Rose et al., 1998: chapter 5).

Given that the Russian Federation has a partial or incomplete democratic regime, the NRB Social Capital survey asked people to evaluate democracy as an ideal, adapting a question pioneered by Doh Chull Shin (1999) in the Republic of Korea, which has likewise not yet completed democratization. Russians were asked to say where they would like their country to be placed on a scale ranging between complete democracy

Figure 1. ENDORSEMENT OF DEMOCRACY AS AN IDEAL

Q. Here is a scale ranging from a low of 1 to a high of 10. On this scale, point 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. Where would you personally like our country to be placed?




Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer Social Capital survey. Fieldwork: 6 March-13 April, 1998. Number of respondents: 1,908.

(point 10) and complete dictatorship (point 1). The largest group, 36 percent, said they would like their system to be completely democratic. Almost three-quarters chose a position in the top half of the scale arithmetically and an additional 13 percent chose 5, the psychological mid-point of the scale (Figure 2).

Since Russians have lived longer under undemocratic rule than under a regime based on free elections, the Social Capital survey also asked whether people would prefer to return to a Communist regime, have the army rule or be governed by a tough dictator (Figure 2). Each alternative is opposed to the cooperative democratic values postulated in theories of social capital. Although the median Russian is in favour of democracy as an ideal, 61 percent were prepared to endorse at least one undemocratic alternative. However, Russians disagreed about which undemocratic alternative would be preferable: 41 percent endorsed a return to

Figure 2. ATTITUDES TOWARD UNDEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVES

Q. There are different opinions about the nature of the state. To what extent would you agree with the following statements:



Source: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, New Russia Barometer Social Capital survey, 1998.

Communist rule, 36 percent a tough dictatorship; and 15 percent military rule. Among those with sympathy for undemocratic rule, 38 percent were selectively undemocratic, favouring only one undemocratic alternative; 18 percent favoured two alternatives; and 5 percent were uncritically anti-democratic, endorsing all three alternatives.

III MEASURES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Many studies of social capital depend on the secondary analysis of data collected for other purposes, a situation that encourages the uncritical acceptance of any available quantitative indicator as a proxy for individual social capital. A number of studies cite aggregate figures of organizational membership or any other group activity for which aggregate data is readily available. The association between democratic values and social capital is inferred from trends in national aggregate data or from cross-national aggregate correlations. It is not tested by the conventional social science method of designing and fielding a survey that provides individual-level

data that can be subject to multivariate analysis determining the extent to which social capital, as against other forms of capital, influence individual values. While Robert Putnam's study of social capital in the United States (2000) cites an enormous variety of social capital indicators, he does not support his argument with systematic multivariate analysis of American survey data.

The NRB questionnaire offers multiple measures of social capital in many forms, as well as measuring democratic and undemocratic values. It was developed in a seven-year process in which questionnaires were written in order to translate anecdotes about networking endemic in ethnographic writing about Russia into valid and quantified data about an individual's involvement in different networks relevant to the concept of social capital (see www.socialcapital.strath.ac.uk). Instead of assuming a single meaning, the questionnaire incorporated alternative approaches, thus making it possible to test the influence on democratic values of competing concepts of social capital.

Trust in people is typically used as the prime social psychological indicator of social capital, and this is the case whether trust is conceived as a consequence or a cause of participation in social networks. The NRB Social Capital Survey repeated the World Values Survey measure of social trust: *Would you say that most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful in dealing with people?* By defining the 'radius of trust' (Fukuyama, 1995) as extending well beyond face-to-face ties, the question focuses on conditions essential for trust to "spill up" to large-scale formal organizations necessary in a modern society. Given socialization into a totalitarian or post-totalitarian environment, Russians tend to be distrustful of others. Only 7 percent say you can usually trust most people and an additional 27 percent think this is sometimes possible. Two-thirds say that you sometimes or usually need to be careful when dealing with other people.²

². When the tenth NRB survey asked separate questions about trust in 'most people in this country' and 'most people you know', 32 percent said they trusted most people, while 55 percent said they trusted most people they knew (Rose, 2001: 36). This confirms that the measure of social trust used in this paper concerns most Russians rather than people whom you know.

Organizational involvement, as distinct from nominal membership, offers a behavioural approach to social capital networks. Participation in organizations with local branches and a national headquarters, for example, a trade union or a church, links face-to-face groups with large formal organizations stating national policies, a necessary condition for national, as distinct from "town meeting" democracy. In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party controlled social, cultural and civic organizations directly or indirectly, and its totalitarian derived efforts to mobilize the population as compulsory members of these organizations generated widespread disaffection. When asked about membership in six different types of named organizations--a sport or recreation group; a musical, literary or art group; a community association; a political party; a housing association; or a charitable organization--only nine percent reported belonging to any type of organization and more than nine-tenths of Russians belong to none.

Many long established sociological concerns with social integration or its opposite, anomie or social exclusion, are often embraced in the concept of social capital. Thus, the NRB Social Capital questionnaire included a variety of familiar behavioural measures of involvement in informal networks such as groups of friends who would look after you when ill or from whom one could borrow money if in need, and major formal organizations, such as churches and trade unions. In Russia church attendance is very low; only 5 percent report going to church at least once a month and 11 percent attend a few times a year. As for trade unions, upwards of two-fifths of the electorate are outside the labour force. Half those in employment do belong to a union, but less than one in five union members trusts both local and national union leaders to look after their interests.

James Coleman's (1990: 302ff) instrumental approach to social capital emphasizes that social capital networks are situation-specific. The network most appropriate for one situation, for example, getting a job, may not be the most appropriate for child care or protection against crime. Trust in government is an example of situation-specific social capital. In post-Communist countries it is far lower than trust in most people or people whom you know. In the NRB Social Capital Survey, only 7 percent

expressed positive trust in political parties, 13 percent in representatives elected to the *Duma* (Parliament), 14 percent in the president, and 18 percent trust in local government. The Social Capital questionnaire therefore asked people what type of network they would turn to in order to get something done. The specifics varied from situation to situation, but the conceptual significance of alternative networks was normally the same. The options were: a formal, modern network (for example, going to a private hospital if a public hospital was inadequate); informal networks (protecting against theft by making sure someone was always at home or keeping a fierce dog); antimodern strategies (offering a bribe to get a municipally owned house or keeping a knife or gun to deal with burglars). If an individual has no network to turn to, this indicates social exclusion.

Many theories of social capital treat it as a diffuse asset productive in many different situations. Therefore, the networks invoked in each of eight different situations have been summed for each individual. Russians do not rely on a single type of network in all situations. Informal networks of friends and neighbours are relied on most often. Given low incomes, the least used alternative was buying goods and services in the market. Antimodern networks involving corruption or using connections to bend or break rules to get things done are second in frequency of use. The average Russian was very rarely socially excluded, that is, without any network to turn to (for details of indices, see Appendix; for discussion, see Rose, 1999: 154ff). As would be expected, those who score high on social exclusion are low in their involvement in other networks³, but there are no substantial correlations among the other three scales.⁴

The Social Capital survey also asked about involvement in politically specific networks. Factor analysis showed that trust takes two forms, trust in authoritative institutions of government (police, courts, and army), and

³. The Pearson r correlation between social exclusion and market networks is -.33; anti-modern networks, -.43, and informal networks, -.29. All three correlations are statistically significant at the .000 level.

⁴. Market networks correlate -.16 with informal networks, and -.05 with anti-modern networks, and anti-modern networks correlate -.0 with informal networks. Only the first of these three correlations is significant at the .000 level.

trust in representative institutions (parties, President and Duma). Being an opinion leader when discussing politics with friends and trusting political information from friends are politically specific informal networks. Membership in the Communist Party and reliance on government programmes involve formal political organizations.

IV TESTING HYPOTHESES OF THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL

Before the word social capital erupted in political science discourse, there was an established paradigm about the determinants of democratic values. There was disagreement about the relative importance of economic influences; education and other forms of human capital; and civic political attitudes. Nonetheless, there was a consensus that together these resources were sufficient to account for democratic values.

**H 1. Established paradigm. The more human capital, economic resources and civic attitudes that individuals have, the more they support democratic values.*

In the first flush of enthusiasm for social capital, established influences on democratic values were treated as secondary or dependent on social capital. This interpretation could be supported by showing simple correlations between individual or aggregate-level social capital indicators and democratic values or by excluded long established influences from a multivariate statistical equation.

**H 2. Social capital paradigm. The more social capital individuals have, the more they support democratic values.*

There is no necessary contradiction between the two paradigms; each can increase support for democratic values without supplanting the other. A multi-causal approach avoids the false antithesis between social capital and established resources by integrating the two categories of influence.

**H 3. Integrated paradigm. The more human capital, social capital, economic resources and civic attitudes individuals have, the more they support democratic values.*

The integrative paradigm leaves open to empirical investigation the relative importance of social capital as against other resources and the particular pathways by which these influences interact with each other.

Testing hypotheses. The three hypotheses can be tested in turn by three sequential multiple regression analyses. Given a multiplicity of definitions and indicators, initially regressions were run with several dozen indicators. Those that failed to register statistical significance at the .05 level were then dropped, except for instances of theoretical relevance, for example, the failure of socio-economic class to influence democratic values. For the most part, the assignment of indicators to categories consistent with each hypothesis is straightforward. For example, education is a prime indicator of human capital and membership in the Communist Party of politically specific social capital (see Appendix for details of independent variables).

Given that Russians have had more experience with undemocratic than with democratic government, each hypothesis is tested with two dependent variables, endorsement of democracy as an ideal (Figure 1) and an addition scale showing the number of times individuals reject undemocratic alternatives (Figure 2). Following the literature, we would expect social capital to be particularly strong in influencing support for democracy as an ideal, even if it is not a major influence on the rejection of undemocratic alternatives.

Hypothesis 1 receives support, as those who have more human capital, economic and civic resources are more likely to reject undemocratic forms of government. Altogether, the measures explain 22.0 percent of the variance in the rejection of undemocratic regimes (Table 1). A negative view of the former Soviet regime (Beta: .24) and an appreciation of greater freedom under the new regime (.13) make people more likely to reject undemocratic alternatives. Economic conditions are also important: those with higher income and more positive about the country's current economic system and their household's future situation are more likely to reject undemocratic alternatives. Human capital is also of substantial importance. The more educated and younger people are, the more likely they are to reject undemocratic alternatives. Women are more likely than men to reject undemocratic alternatives.

The Soviet Union abolished class distinctions rooted in a capitalist society, while substituting a politically based hierarchy of power and influence. Therefore, it is not surprising that a conventional 10-point scale

Table 1 IMPACT OF HUMAN CAPITAL, ECONOMIC AND CIVIC RESOURCES

	Supports Democracy as ideal	Rejects Undemocratic alternatives
Variance explained: adjusted R ²	4.6%	22.0%
	<i>Beta*</i>	<i>Beta*</i>
<u>Civic political attitudes</u>		
Negative rating Communist system	11	24
Feels freer than in old system	08	13
<u>Economic resources</u>		
Household income	-	07
H/hold econ. situation in five years	-	08
Positive current economic system	-	08
Positive economic system in five years	10	-
<u>Human capital</u>		
Age	-	-10
Education	-	06
Control over what happens to me	05	08
Gender	-	08
Socio-economic status	-	-

**OLS regression Beta values significant at <.05.*

Source: New Russia Barometer Social Capital survey, 1998. For details of independent variables, see Appendix.

measuring subjective socio-economic status is not a significant influence. In a society in transformation, Russians are not so much struggling against other classes as they are trying to cope with rapid and unpredictable change in a turbulent, even anomic society. The NRB survey therefore asks people to say how much or how little control they have over their own lives as against being dependent on fate and actions of others. Those who feel most self-control have developed a distinctive form of human capital, confidence in their ability to overcome adversity; they are also more likely to reject undemocratic alternatives.

The established paradigm accounts for only 4.6 percent of the variance in attitudes toward democracy as an ideal form of government; only four of eleven indicators are statistically significant. A greater sense of freedom and a negative view of the Communist regime are each significant, but the Beta statistics are less than for the rejection of undemocratic regimes. One economic indicator--a positive expectation of what the national economic system will be like in five years--is significant, and one human capital measure, gender. The absence of any influence from most human capital and economic indicators is consistent with the expectation that social capital is the key to making citizens more positive about democratic values.

Social capital, however, has even less influence on commitment to the democratic ideal: altogether, 14 different social capital indicators explain only 1.3 percent of the variance (Table 2). None of the six politically specific measures of social capital is significant. Whether individuals trust authoritative institutions (police, courts, Army) or elected representatives (Duma, President, parties) makes no difference, nor does relying on government to help with a problem or, an alternative form of organizational capital, having a family member in the Communist Party in Soviet times. Nor are informal networks significant, such as being an opinion leader or relying on friends for political information. Two measures of diffuse social capital are significant. Russians who rely on the market to solve everyday problems and on anti-modern methods, such as offering bribes or using connections, are more likely to support the democratic ideal. This is a comment on the perception of "Yeltsin-style democracy" (cf. Carnaghan, 2001). Only one of the four measures of traditional social integration, trusting most people, is positively significant for endorsing democracy as an ideal.

Individuals with social capital are a little more likely to reject undemocratic alternatives. Altogether, eight indicators account for 5.5 percent of the variance--but often in different ways than predicted by theories based on the role of social capital in established democracies. Persons who talk about politics with friends and trust them as sources of information are more likely to endorse undemocratic forms of government. The ambiguity of trust is illustrated by those trusting government

Table 2 IMPACT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES

	Supports Democracy as ideal	Rejects Undemocratic alternatives
Variance explained: adjusted R ²	1.3%	5.5%
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>
<u>Social integration</u>		
Trusts most people	06	05
Village resident	-	-07
Belong to organizations	-	-
Church attendance	-	-
<u>Diffuse social capital networks</u>		
Anti-modern	06	-
Market	06	10
Informal	-	-
Socially excluded	-	-10
<u>Politically specific capital</u>		
Communist Party member in family	-	-10
Trusts government authorities	-	-06
Trusts representatives	-	05
Opinion leader	-	-06
Trusts friends for political info.	-	-
Relies on gov't when has problem	-	-
<i>OLS regression Beta values significant < .05</i>		

Source: New Russia Barometer Social Capital survey, 1998. For details of independent variables, see Appendix.

authorities being more likely to endorse undemocratic alternatives, while Russians who trust elected representatives are more likely to reject undemocratic alternatives. Even though the Beta values for these two influences are almost the same, their size is not. An average of 25 percent of Russians trust the Army, courts and police, more than twice as many as the 11 percent on average trusting Duma representatives, the President or parties. Having family ties to the old Communist Party is more likely to

make people endorse undemocratic alternatives. Individuals most involved in market networks are more likely to support democratic rule, and persons who are socially excluded or live in villages are more likely to support undemocratic forms of government.

The fall back case for social capital, stated in Hypothesis 3, is that even if it is not the dominant influence it should contribute substantially to democratic ideals. But in Russia this is not so. When social capital influences are integrated with civic attitudes, economic resources and human capital, the variance explained in support for the democratic ideal remains exactly the same, 4.6 percent, as the established paradigm does without taking social capital into account.⁵ Of the few significant influences, the most important are civic attitudes about the former Communist regime and about gains in freedom in the new Russian Federation. Economic evaluations are also significant. Net of the established paradigm's influence on support for democracy as an ideal, only one of the 14 indicators of social capital, trust in most people, manages to be statistically significant. Concurrently, two diffuse scales of social capital become insignificant when influences from the established paradigm are taken into account (cf. Tables 3 and 1 and 2).

Integrating social capital along with civic, economic and human capital adds 1.2 percent to the 22.0 percent of the variance that the established paradigm explains in the rejection of undemocratic alternatives (cf. Tables 2 and 3). Civic attitudes remain the most important: the Beta for an individual's evaluation of the Communist regime is .24, and appreciation of gains in freedom has a Beta of .13. Together, age, education and gender are of substantial influence, and control over one's own life, remains significant too, and the same economic resources are also significant. Taking into account influences in the established paradigm reduces the number of statistically significant social capital indicators from eight to six (cf. Tables 2 and 3).

⁵. Given a degree of skewness in the distribution of endorsement for democracy as an ideal, a number of additional regressions were run with the dependent variable collapsed to reduce or eliminate this, and the independent variables kept the same. This made no difference to the total proportion of variance explained or to the classification of independent variables as insignificant or significant.

Table 3 INTEGRATING INFLUENCES ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES

	Supports Democracy <u>as ideal</u>		Rejects Undemocratic <u>alternatives</u>	
Total variance explained: adjusted R ²	4.6%		23.2%	
	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>b</i>	<i>Beta</i>
ESTABLISHED PARADIGM				
<u>Civic attitudes</u>				
Negative rating Communist system	.005	11	.004	24
Feels freer than in old system	.175	09	.088	13
<u>Economic resources</u>				
Income		-	.0007	08
H/hold econ. situation in five years		-	.078	09
Positive current econ system	-.003	-06	.001	07
Positive econ system in five years	.005	09		-
<u>Human capital</u>				
Age		-	-.005	-10
Education		-	.026	08
Gender		-	.153	09
Control over own life		-	.032	08
Socio-economic status		-		-
SOCIAL CAPITAL				
<u>Social integration</u>				
Trusts most people	.157	05		-
Church attendance		-	-.005	-05
Village resident		-		-
Belong to organizations		-		-
<u>Diffuse social capital</u>				
Anti-modern		-	-.044	-07
Informal		-	-.043	-06
Socially excluded		-	-.038	-06
Market		-		-
<u>Politically specific capital</u>				
Communist Party member in family		-	-.151	-08
Trusts government authorities		-	-.011	-05
Trusts representatives		-		-
Opinion leader		-		-
Trusts friends for information		-		-
Relies on gov't when has problem		-		-

(b value is unstandardized regression coefficient. Beta is standardized coefficient).

Source: New Russia Barometer Social Capital survey, 1998. For details of independent variables, see Appendix.

The integrated model shows that in Russia neither trust nor organizational membership determines democratic values. When established influences are introduced, trust in other people is no longer statistically significant, and the same is true of trust in elected representatives.⁶ The sole measure that does remain significant is trust in authoritarian institutions--the Army, courts and the police--that are far from the cooperative ideal envisioned in social capital theories. The integrated model also shows that membership in face-to-face and formal organizations is not a source of democratic values in Russia.

At least to a limited degree, social capital networks actually increase support for undemocratic forms of governance, such as having a member of their family belong to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. It is also striking that two measures of diffuse social capital--involvement in informal networks and reliance on anti-modern networks--are significant but not in the expected direction. Net of all other influences, Russians involved in informal networks are actually more likely to support undemocratic alternatives than those who are not, and the same is true for those who are socially excluded.

Altogether, the three regression models show most support for Hypothesis 1, for the established civic, economic and human capital characteristics of individuals have a big influence on the rejection of undemocratic alternatives and their influence on support for the democratic ideal, while low in absolute terms, nonetheless explains more than three times the variance explained by social capital measures. While social capital measures have some influence on the rejection of undemocratic values, the variance thus explained is less than a quarter that explained without reference to social capital.

The cumulative impact. We can calculate the impact of significant influences on democratic values by making use of the unstandardized regression coefficients (b) of each independent variable significant in Table 3. The b value shows how much change is likely to occur in an individual's support for the democratic ideal or rejection of undemocratic values as the

⁶. The significance level of trust in other people is .10 (Beta .03) and for trust in representatives it is .46 (Beta .02).

result of one unit of change in an independent variable. Independent variables differ in their metrics; for example, gender is a dichotomous variable, while trust in other people is a four-point scale and income a continuous variable. To compare the impact of different influences, we calculate how much democratic values are likely to change if a person's position on a given independent variable alters by one standard deviation from its mean in the 1998 New Russia Barometer survey, as reported in the Appendix.

Civic variables have the greatest impact on support for democracy as an ideal (Table 4). If a person is one standard deviation above the mean in feeling freer than under Communist rule and is similarly more negative about that regime, they are likely to be half a point higher on the ten-point scale of commitment to democracy as an ideal. Similarly, those above the mean in viewing the economic system positively and in optimism about the future are more than two-fifths of a point higher in endorsing democracy as an ideal. While trust in other people also has a positive impact, it changes attitudes by only 0.13 of a point. The very poor fit between social capital influences and endorsement of democracy as an ideal confirms its low influence.

Many sources have some impact on the rejection of undemocratic alternatives. The biggest impact is again registered by civic attitudes: Russians one standard deviation above the mean in negative feeling about the old regime and in feeling freer now are almost a third of a point closer to rejecting all three undemocratic alternatives. Human capital has almost as strong an impact. Russians who are younger, more educated, female and have a greater sense of control over their lives are an additional third of a point closer to rejecting all undemocratic alternatives. An increase in income and economic optimism moves Russians an additional fifth of a point closer to rejecting all three undemocratic alternatives.

While the cumulative impact of established influences implies that a person one standard deviation above the mean on all nine variables will almost certainly reject all undemocratic values, the probability of these attributes all being conjoined in the same person is very low, as those one standard deviation above the mean on any one measure are by definition a minority of the population. Nonetheless, many influences are likely to go

Table 4 IMPACT OF SIGNIFICANT INFLUENCES ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES

<u>Democracy as an ideal</u>		<i>Impact</i>	<i>Mean 7.41</i>
Civic:	Negative Communist system	30	7.71
	Feels freer than in old system	23	7.94
Economic:	Positive current economic system	17	8.11
	Positive econ system in 5 years	27	8.38
Social capital:	Trusts most people	13	8.51
<u>Rejection of undemocratic alternatives</u>		<i>Impact</i>	<i>Mean 2.11</i>
Civic:	Negative Communist system	21	2.32
	Feel freer now than before	11	2.43
Economic:	Income	8	2.51
	Household econ situation in 5 yrs	8	2.59
	Positive current economic system	6	2.65
Human capital:	Younger	9	2.74
	Control over own life	8	2.82
	More educated	7	2.89
	Female	7	2.96
Social capital:	Communist Party member in family	-7	2.89
	Trusts government authorities	-5	2.84
	Anti-modern networks	-6	2.78
	Informal networks	-5	2.73
	Socially excluded	-5	2.68
	Church attendance	-4	2.64

(Impact: Calculated by multiplying the unstandardized regression coefficient (b) by one standard deviation from its mean)

Sources: Standard deviations as in Appendix; unstandardized coefficients for regressions reported in Table 3.

together. For example, more educated people are likely to be younger, people with an above-average income are more likely to be positive about the current and future economic system, and those most negative about the Communist system are likely to feel very strongly that they are freer today than before.

Contrary to hypothesis 2, Russians involved in social capital networks tend to be less supportive of democratic values. This is true of people who trust government authorities today and of people who were members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or had a family member in the Party. Church goers are also more likely to support undemocratic alternatives. Contrary to Putnam's theory, the spill over and spill up effects of being in both informal and anti-modern networks lead Russians to support undemocratic alternatives. In addition, exclusion from any social network encourages support for undemocratic alternatives.

Although half a dozen social capital indicators have some impact on undemocratic alternatives, their total impact is much less than that of the established paradigm. Moreover, those involved in social capital networks, such as church attenders or Party members, are a small minority of the Russian population and far fewer than those feeling optimistic about future economic conditions or freer now than in Communist times. Hence, the cumulative impact of the established paradigm has more than two and one-half the impact on undemocratic values as does social capital.⁷ Taken at face value, the evidence implies, contrary to Tocqueville-inspired paradigms, that a decrease in social capital would increase support for democratic values.

The Russian evidence is best interpreted as a caution that any positive merits in social capital are contingent. In Russia, people who trust authority are more likely to favour undemocratic alternatives, because it is Communist-style rather than democratic institutions that they trust. Similarly, organizational membership are neutral. Furthermore, a link with

⁷. The mean value of the zero to three scale of rejection of undemocratic alternatives is raised by 0.85 points by established paradigm influences, while being lowered by only 0.32 points by social capital influences.

the Communist Party does not encourage democratic commitment and attendance at a church subservient to Stalin does not breed the commitment to liberal democratic values of belonging to a Quaker meeting.

V BROADER IMPLICATIONS

The strength of the established paradigm and the weakness of social capital in Russia is so much against the grain of current writing that it could be argued that it is due to inadequate measurement of social capital. If this were the case, then the social capital indicators in the NRB survey would not add anything to the explanation of other phenomena, such as health (cf. Putnam, 2000: section 4). But this is not the case. Similar regression analyses with the same set of data and different dependent variables show that social capital networks have as much influence on the physical and emotional health of Russians as measures of human capital and income (Rose, 2000a). They also have more influence on a sense of safety on the street; as much influence on income security; and a noteworthy influence on getting enough food (Rose, 2000). Moreover, these additional analyses show that anti-modern forms of social capital are more important than the friendly forms of social capital emphasized by Putnam. Since more than two dozen countries have been subject to generations of Communist rule, the NRB approach is suitable for comparative analysis and the focus on using networks to compensate for deficiencies in the economy and/or the polity makes it potentially generalizable to developing countries across many continents.

Analysis of data from a single country requires the caution that it may be different. Russia is certainly very different from the United States, for socialization into a totalitarian or post-totalitarian regime has left Russians with a legacy of distrust very different from American predispositions to collective action. However, it can be argued that it is the United States, not Russia, that is exceptional--as many Americanists have done (cf. Hartz, 1964; Shafer, 1991). From a global perspective, the post-totalitarian legacy of Russians is shared with more than a billion people from East Berlin to Beijing. For example, the social capital networks that Chinese use to get things done in the People's Republic of China are similar

to the reciprocal exploitation practices of the Soviet Union (cf. Shi, 1997; Ledeneva, 1998).

A justifiable concern with putting limits to generalization from Russian experience implies a more important proposition: context matters both for social capital and support for democratic values (cf. Mishler and Rose, 2001). In an undemocratic regime, a commitment to democratic values can lead to a rejection of existing political institutions. In a regime that is incompletely democratic, the situation is more complex, depending on whether the missing element in the regime is accountability to the electorate, as in Singapore, or the rule of law, as in Russia (cf. Rose and Mishler, 2002).

The importance of civic attitudes is a reminder that politics matters, and politics changes with national context. The influences with the greatest impact on Russians are derived from living under very different regimes, a post-totalitarian party-state and an electoralist democracy. The latter is judged in the light of the former. However, in an established democracy politics cannot reflect comparisons between regimes, and choices between parties and personalities are far less great than between democratic and undemocratic alternatives. The experience of regime change places Russia in the mainstream of global politics, for today established democracies are the exception rather than the rule.

Notwithstanding the above qualifications, the great majority of the significant influences on democratic values in Russia are common to social science paradigms generally. This is most obviously the case for education, age and gender. While the mean level of income differs between OECD countries and even more worldwide, every country has a greater or lesser degree of income inequality. Within-country differences in economic satisfaction and future economic expectations are also found everywhere. Moreover, the weak or non-existent influence of trust on democratic values is not restricted to Russia; it can be found across Europe too (Newton, 1999: 180ff; Rose et al., 1998: Table 8.4).

The meteoric rise of social capital as an all-purpose explanation threatens a meteoric fall if the expectations raised are not qualified. Prudent proponents of the concept as well as sceptics have good reason to adopt the old Russian proverb that was a favourite of both Lenin and

Ronald Reagan, "Trust but verify". The multi-causal integrative model set out here is a generally applicable method for determining empirically to what extent, under which circumstances, in which national contexts and to what ends social capital does or does not add to our understanding of individual and collective welfare in society.

REFERENCES

- Black, John, 1997. A Dictionary of Economics. Oxford: Oxford U. Press.
- Boix, Carlos and Posner, Daniel N., 1998. "Social Capital: Explaining its Origins and Effects on Government Performance", British Journal of Political Science, 28, 4, 686-693.
- Bratton, Michael, and Mattes, Robert, 2001. "Africans' Surprising Universalism", Journal of Democracy, 12, 1, 107-121.
- Carnaghan, Ellen, 2001. "Thinking about Democracy: Interviews with Russian Citizens", Slavic Review, 60,2, 336-366.
- Coleman, James S., 1990. Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Dahl, Robert A., 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Dasgupta, Partha, 1988. "Trust as a Commodity". In Diego Gambetta, ed., Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 49-72.
- Freedom House, 2001. "The 2000 Freedom House Survey", Journal of Democracy, 12,1, 87-92.
- Fukuyama, Francis, 1995. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New York: Free Press.
- Hartz, Louis et al., 1964. The Founding of New Societies. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
- Inglehart, Ronald, 1997. Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 41 Societies. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ledeneva, Alena V., 1998. Russia's Economy of Favours. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Mishler, William and Rose, Richard, 2001, "Political Support for Incomplete Democracies: Realist vs. Idealist Theories and Measures", International Political Science Review, 22,4, 303-320.
- Newton, Kenneth, 1999. "Social and Political Trust in Established Democracies". In Pippa Norris, ed., Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford: Oxford U. Press, 169-187.
- North, Douglass C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D., 1993. Making Democracy Work, with Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y. Nanetti. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Putnam, Robert, 1997. "Democracy in America at Century's End". In Axel Hadenius, ed., Democracy's Victory and Crisis. New York: Cambridge University Press, 27-70.
- Putnam, Robert D., 2000. Bowling Alone: the Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Rose, Richard, 1998. Getting Things Done with Social Capital: New Russia Barometer VII. Glasgow: U. of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy No. 303.
- Rose, Richard, 1999. "Getting Things Done in an Anti-Modern Society: Social Capital Networks in Russia". In Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin, eds., Social Capital: A Multi-faceted Perspective Washington DC: The World Bank, 147-171.
- Rose, Richard, 2000. "Uses of Social Capital in Russia: Modern, Pre-Modern and Anti-Modern", Post-Soviet Affairs, 16,1, 33-57.
- Rose, Richard, 2000. "How Much Does Social Capital Add to Individual Health? A Survey Study of Russia", Social Science and Medicine, 51, 1421-1435.
- Rose, Richard, 2001. Russians Under Putin: New Russia Barometer 10. Glasgow: U. of Strathclyde Studies in Public Policy No. 350.
- Rose, Richard and Mishler, William, forthcoming 2002. "Comparing Regime Support in Non-Democratic and Democratic Countries", Democratization.
- Rose, Richard, Mishler, William, and Haerpfer, Christian, 1998. Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies. Oxford: Polity Press and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Rose, Richard and Shin, Doh Chull, 2001. "Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies", British Journal of Political Science, 34,1, 30-62.
- Serageldin, Ismail and Steer, Andrew, eds. 1994. Making Development Sustainable: From Concepts to Action. Washington DC: World Bank Environmentally Sustainable Development Occasional Paper 2.
- Shafer, Byron, ed., 1991. Is America Different? New York: Oxford University Press.
- Shi, Tianjian, 1997. Political Participation in Beijing. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Shin, Doh Chull, 1999. Mass Politics and Culture in Democratizing Korea. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Shlapentokh, Vladimir, 1989. Public and Private Life of the Soviet People. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Simon, Janos, 1998. "Popular Conceptions of Democracy in Postcommunist Europe". In S.H. Barnes and J. Simon, ed., The Postcommunist Citizen. Budapest: Erasmus Foundation and Institute for Political Science, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 79-116.
- Weber, Max, 1947. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press.

Appendix. DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL VARIABLES

Dependent Variables	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	S.D.
Rejecting undemocratic alternatives ¹	0 None	3 All rejected	2.11	0.88
Democracy Ideal	1 Complete dictatorship	10 Complete democracy	7.41	2.73
Human capital				
Age	18 years	90 years	44.19	15.89
Education	1 Elementary	9 University	5.17	2.53
Female	0 Male	1 Female	0.54	0.50
Control of what happens to me	1 No control	10 Full control	5.17	2.33
Socio-economic status	1 Lowest	7 Highest	3.85	1.95
Economic capital, attitudes				
Household monthly income	175 roubles	4200 roubles	1166	935
Future household economic situation compared to now	1 Lots worse	5 Much better	2.91	1.02
Rating current economic system	-100	100	-26.4	49.7
Rating economic system in 5 yrs	-100	100	-0.14	52.8
Civic political attitudes				
Rating Communist political system	-100	100	31.9	52.9
Feel freer than in old system ²	0 Lowest	4 Highest	2.89	1.30
Social Integration				
Church attendance	1 Never	4 At least once per month	1.66	0.86
Trust most people or must be careful	1 Very careful	4 Trust most	2.20	0.85
Village resident	0 No	1 Yes	0.28	0.44
Belongs to organizations	0 No	1 Yes	0.09	0.29
Diffuse social capital networks				
Anti-modern scale ³	0 None	8 Maximum	2.20	1.43
Market network scale ⁴	0 None	8 Maximum	1.35	1.11
Informal networks scale ⁵	0 None	8 Maximum	2.88	1.16
Social exclusion scale ⁶	0 None	8 Maximum	1.39	1.26
Politically specific capital				
Communist party member in family	0 No	1 Yes	0.34	0.47
Trusts government authorities ⁷	3 Min. trust	21 Max. trust	10.3	4.1
Trusts representatives ⁸	3 Min. trust	21 Max. trust	7.5	3.6
Opinion leader: national/local ⁹	1 Outsider both	5 Leader both	3.00	1.74
Friends as source of information ¹⁰	2 Very poor	8 Very good	5.46	1.44
Relies on government help ¹¹	0 No	1 Yes	0.08	0.27

The following variables have been collapsed: Socio-economic status from 10pt to 7pt; Income from 50-5000+ to 175-4200; Church attendance from 5pt to 4 pt.

ENDNOTES

1. Communist regime, army rule, and dictatorship (H5a,b,d).
2. Sum of feeling freer in freedom of speech, joining organizations, religion, and participating in politics (G2a,b,d,e).
3. Anti-modern networks used for housing repair, precaution against theft, obtaining social benefit, getting a permit, getting a flat, entering university, seeing a doctor, enterprising portfolio.
4. Market networks used for housing repair, precaution against theft, bank borrowing, retirement resources, getting a flat, entering university, seeing a doctor, official economy portfolio.
5. Informal networks for used for housing repair, safety in the streets, obtaining social benefit, retirement resources, getting a flat, entering university, seeing a doctor, defensive economic portfolio.
6. No network for housing repair, obtaining social benefit, retirement resources, getting a permit, getting a flat, entering university, seeing a doctor, marginal economic portfolio.
7. Sum of trusting police, courts, and the army, each having a 7 point scale with 1 equals no trust and 7 highest trust.
8. Sum of trusting the Duma, parties, and the President, each having a 7 point scale with 1 equals no trust and 7 highest trust.
9. Derived variable from f2a, f2b, f3a, and f3b, respondent talks about problems of city and country with friends as is or is not asked their views by other people.
10. Derived scale FRNDINF from F4a.c (Rating friends as source of information in the country) and F4b.c (Rating friends as source of information for the city).
11. RELYGOV, respondent relies first or second on local, central government institutions when has a problem (K1a, K1b).